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No commentsJeff Immelt on the Humbling of GE
No commentsIn the summer of 2001, weeks before Jeff Immelt became CEO of General Electric, he was playing golf with friends at a country club near Chicago when a club member asked him what he did. “I work for GE, ” Mr. Immelt replied, omitting his title. “Ah, GE! Jack Welch !” the man said. “I feel sorry for the poor son of a bitch who’s taking his place.”
The late Jack Welch was indeed a tough act to follow. The man dubbed the “manager of the century” by Fortune magazine quintupled the company’s revenues and increased shareholder returns 70-fold during his tenure from 1981 to 2001. At its 2000 peak, GE’s market capitalization soared to $600 billion.
Twenty years on, GE is a husk of its former self. The nearly 130-year-old conglomerate has shed some $500 billion in value and almost half its global workforce. Its profits have plunged, its stock has tumbled, and it recently paid $200 million to settle with the Securities and Exchange Commission over claims that it misled investors. GE has sold off many of its businesses, and it has cut its dividend to a token penny a share—a stunning fall for a one-time market leader in everything from lightbulbs to jet engines. Many point fingers at Mr. Immelt, 65, who led the company for 16 years until he was nudged out in 2017.
Mr. Immelt (right) and General Electric CEO Jack Welch (left) during a news conference in New York City, Nov. 27, 2000.
PHOTO: SHAWN BALDWIN/BLOOMBERG NEWS“It became clear right away that my main role would be Person to Blame,” Mr. Immelt writes in his new book “Hot Seat: What I Learned Leading a Great American Company,” which will be published Feb. 23. While he admits he made mistakes, he says he felt moved to write about his years at GE’s helm to highlight the often-dire context of his decisions. “I dealt with bad news almost every day,” Mr. Immelt says over Zoom from his home on Kiawah Island, off the coast of South Carolina.
Despite Mr. Welch’s hallowed legacy, Mr. Immelt says that many of GE’s problems were inherited. “I’d become CEO of a company where perception didn’t equal reality,” he writes. GE’s shares were overvalued, high returns from its pension funds inflated earnings, and the company relied too heavily on its financial division, GE Capital, which contributed nearly half the firm’s earnings in 2001 by loading up on debt and becoming overleveraged in the insurance business.
Mr. Immelt says he knew GE Capital’s prominence was a problem, but it never seemed like the right time to curtail the company’s “only engine of growth.” By offering essentially all the services of a bank (consumer lending, auto loans, insurance, subprime mortgages), GE Capital grew almost twice as fast as the company as a whole. GE’s industrial business gave the company an AAA rating, which allowed GE Capital to borrow money cheaply and increased the margins of its financial investments.
Mr. Immelt argues that GE needed these funds to help support its industrial businesses, which he says had suffered from a lack of investment and innovation on Mr. Welch’s watch. But Mr. Immelt says that failing to wean the company off GE Capital’s cash early on was probably his biggest mistake. “We basically decided to try to grow them both simultaneously,” he says of the company’s financial and industrial businesses. “By the financial crisis, that didn’t look so smart.”
The 2008 crisis dealt an existential blow to GE, which had become the largest nonbank finance company in the world, with some $545 billion in debt. It took years and the backing of the Federal Reserve to stabilize the firm after its financial profits cratered. (A self-described stress-eater, Mr. Immelt “could squeeze into” only one of his suits at the time.) By the time Mr. Immelt finally sold off most of GE Capital in 2015, the damage was largely done.
‘I wish I had experienced more different things to be better prepared for the world I saw.’
Mr. Immelt’s first Monday in the top job was Sept. 10, 2001. Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks the next day “marked the end of an era,” he says. Having joined GE in 1982, after studying math at Dartmouth and business at Harvard, Mr. Immelt rose through the ranks during a largely “tranquil” time when China was a sleeping giant and the U.S. economy expanded at a reliably impressive rate. The world he inherited as CEO, however, was “raucous, volatile and unpredictable,” full of bursting bubbles (dot-com, housing, power), disruptive rivals and increased scrutiny. “I wish I had experienced more different things to be better prepared for the world I saw,” he says.
Yet some of the problems that hobbled Mr. Immelt’s GE were self-inflicted. Critics say that he often bought businesses at too high a price and sold others at a loss. He could be extravagant, traveling overseas with a spare corporate jet, and he made some costly bets that never paid off, such as spending billions on a digital strategy in the industrial-services market that the company has largely dismantled. (Mr. Immelt points to “dozens of disrupters” that are now targeting this market as evidence of his prescience.) He also spent more than $24 billion in 2016 and 2017 buying back stock, only for the price to fall.
He has earned criticism for not getting GE completely out of the insurance business. Although the company seemed to shed its risky portfolio in the mid-2000s, in 2018 GE disclosed that it had just written off more than $6 billion for its long-term-care insurance and would need another $15 billion over seven years. Mr. Immelt says that he had to keep these holdings to sell off the others. He now sees that it would have been better to dump these remnants at any price.
Alstom CEO Patrick Kron (left) stands with Mr. Immelt (center) and Steve Bolze (right), chief executive officer of General Electric’s power and water unit, against the backdrop of a turbine unit inside the manufacturing facilities of an Alstom plant, Belfort, France, June 24, 2014.
PHOTO: SIMON DAWSON/BLOOMBERG NEWSMr. Immelt’s biggest deal has often been called his worst. GE spent more than $10 billion in 2015 to buy Alstom, a French company that makes trains, power turbines and generators, but the move proved costly and ill-timed. GE essentially invested in carbon-fueled energy equipment just as that market was cooling, and time-consuming regulations and concessions stripped the deal of much of its value. Mr. Immelt defends the strategy behind the deal and says that the board reviewed the acquisition at least 12 times. He places much of the blame on Steve Bolze, who ran GE Power before he left for Blackstone in 2017, for failing to capitalize on the acquisition. Leaving Mr. Bolze in his job at GE “is something I’ll always regret,” Mr. Immelt writes. Mr. Bolze says that Mr. Immelt’s “narrative simply doesn’t align with the facts…While no deal is ever perfect, I remain proud of the GE Power team and its record executing in a tough and ever-changing environment.”
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Mr. Immelt says that he relied on “GE’s system of internal checks and balances.” Some insiders have complained that Mr. Immelt prized optimism and suppressed dissent, preferring “success theater” to rigorous accountability. As both CEO and chairman, he also had some control over who sat on GE’s board. But Mr. Immelt says that he surrounded himself with people he trusted to be honest and regularly invited executives to his home to pick their brains. Looking back, he says that he wishes he had said “I don’t know” more often: “There’s a certain sense of vulnerability to saying I haven’t figured this out yet. But there are a few times when that would’ve served me better.”
Running a company is “a lonely job,” Mr. Immelt found. As a lecturer at Stanford’s business school and a partner at a Bay Area venture-capital firm, he now regularly warns young entrepreneurs that there is no playbook for success. But he feels a responsibility to impart what he sees as the core lessons from his time at GE: When you have a tailwind, don’t get arrogant; and when you have a headwind, don’t give up.
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No commentsHSBC Doesn't Have to Give Documents to Huawei CFO, U.K. Judge Says
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U.S. Justice Department has accused Meng Wanzhou of misleading the bank about Huawei’s ties to Iran
Meng Wanzhou, third from left, was arrested by Canadian police in 2018 on behalf of the U.S. Justice Department.
PHOTO: DARRYL DYCK/BLOOMBERG NEWS- SAVE
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HSBC HSBC 0.54% Holdings PLC doesn’t need to hand over banking documents requested by Huawei Technologies Co. Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou as part of her effort to resist a U.S. extradition order, a judge in London’s High Court said.
Ms. Meng, who filed a lawsuit at the U.K. court, was arrested by Canadian police in 2018 on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice, which has accused her in a criminal case of misleading HSBC about Huawei’s business ties in Iran while the country was subject to U.S. sanctions.
Huawei is one of China’s top companies and a global leader in telecommunications equipment. Ms. Meng asked the court in London, where HSBC is based, to obtain documents that her lawyers said would prove she didn’t mislead the bank. She is currently living in Vancouver under bail terms requiring her to wear an ankle monitor and be supervised by court-appointed security.
“I have no jurisdiction to make the order sought,” Judge Michael Fordham said Friday.
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An HSBC spokeswoman said the bank was pleased with the court’s ruling, saying the bank wasn’t party to the underlying U.S. case or the extradition request in Canada.
A Huawei spokesman said the company was disappointed by the ruling.
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“The pursuit of justice benefits from access to relevant information and clarity of fact,” he said. “Huawei remains confident in Meng Wanzhou’s innocence and will continue to support her pursuit of justice and freedom.”
The U.S. case against Ms. Meng has further inflamed its relations with China and deepened HSBC’s entanglement in the geopolitical standoff. The bank, which competes with the likes of Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., services multinational companies, but makes most of its profit in Hong Kong and China.
Last year, HSBC supported Beijing’s imposition of a new security law in Hong Kong. The move angered U.S. and U.K. politicians who said it undermined an agreement to give the city a high degree of autonomy after the British handed it back to China in 1997.
As the controversy over the national security law peaked last summer, Chinese state media accused HSBC of setting Huawei up in Ms. Meng’s case. The reports forced HSBC to issue a statement saying it wasn’t involved in the U.S.’s decision to investigate Huawei or to arrest Ms. Meng, who is the daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei.
Ms. Meng’s situation is seen by many in China as an attempt by Washington to slow the country’s global ascent. Her arrest also touched off a major diplomatic standoff with Canada, with two Canadians, including a diplomat on leave from his post, detained in China and charged with espionage. China has denied any direct links between the arrests and Ms. Meng’s case.
HSBC handed documents to the U.S. in the Huawei case in 2016. At the time, it was being monitored by the Justice Department as part of a 2012 settlement over sanctions breaches and money laundering. Huawei lawyers have alleged that the Justice Department’s grip on the bank gave HSBC a motive to present Huawei as the mastermind of its sanctions violations. HSBC has denied that.
The U.S. has accused Ms. Meng of misrepresenting the relationship between Huawei and a company called Skycom Tech Co., which did business in Iran, to HSBC, including in a PowerPoint presentation handed to an HSBC banker in a Hong Kong restaurant in August 2013. The U.S. has alleged that HSBC subsequently relied on the presentation to clear millions of dollars in transactions that potentially violated U.S. sanctions against Iran.
Ms. Meng’s lawyers told a Canadian court last year that the U.S. made “reckless misstatements” about her 2013 presentation, which they said identified Skycom as a partner that conducts business activities in Iran. Ms. Meng wanted HSBC to hand over documents which mention Huawei, Skycom or the PowerPoint presentation.
“Knowledge of the true relationship between Huawei and Skycom was in fact shared by HSBC’s senior executives,” Ms. Meng’s lawyers said in a filing to the London court.
HSBC opposed Ms. Meng’s request, arguing that the London High Court doesn’t have jurisdiction to make the order sought and the information she wanted may include documents held by HSBC units in different places around the world. A lawyer for the bank said at a court hearing last week that responding to the request could take “several months.”






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